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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-2-2(3)0) (2002).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Plaintiff/Appellee (hereinafter "Plaintiff) disagrees somewhat with the statement of
the issues presented by Defendants/Appellants (hereinafter "Defendants").
I.

FIRST ISSUE

The first issue for review in this case is the same that was presented to the Utah Court
of Appeals in Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d 768,771 (Utah App. 1997):
[W]hether the trial court correctly denied [Defendants'] Rule [60(b)(4)] motion
to vacate the default judgment by holding that the trial court properly granted
alternative service of process based upon the affidavit and record before it.
This statement of the issue is roughly analogous to the first issue presented by
Defendants in thtiv Brief of Appellant. {See Brief of Appellant, at 1, of record.)
The proper standard of review is double-faceted. See id. at 771 -772. De novo review
is proper when "determining whether an affidavit supporting service is false and[/or]
determining whether due diligence has been exercised[.]" Bonneville Billing, 949 P.2d at
772. Such questions are "essential to resolving whether a trial court has personal jurisdiction
over the defendant." Id. However, "whether the trial court should have ordered a certain
type of process it had decided met the constitutional requirements" is reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard. Id. (citing Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 1269, 1277 (Utah 1987).
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In their Brief of Appellant, Defendants only challenge the trial court's determination
of reasonable diligence and not the type of process ordered by the Court. Thus, this Court
must decide whether the trial court should have granted alternative service of process based
upon the affidavit and record before it. This is a question of law, reviewed for correctness.
II.

SECOND ISSUE

Was the trial court's consideration of Plaintiff s redemption of the property at two
previous tax sales and Defendants' reliance on a single phone call in 1986 proper in
determining whether Plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence to warrant an order for
alternative process under the totality of circumstances in this case?
This issue is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See Parker v. Ross, 217
P.2d 373 (Utah 1950).
III.

THIRD ISSUE

Assuming that service of process by publication was effective to bring Defendants
under the jurisdiction of the Court, was the trial court correct in entering default judgment
against Defendants based upon the contents of Plaintiff s Complaint?
This is essentially the third issue presented by Defendants in their Brief

Plaintiff

agrees that the standard of review is de novo.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
After nearly two decades of inactivity, indifference, and evasion, Defendants are now
attempting to wrest from Plaintiffs control real property to which Plaintiff is statutorily
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entitled, having met the requirements to adversely possess the same, having spent
considerable time, money, and effort improving, redeeming, and possessing the same, and
having obtained a properly entered default judgment granting Plaintiff title to the same.
Defendants have managed to avoid the responsibility, but now seek the benefits of land
ownership in Utah by belatedly attacking the entry of default judgment against them.
Semantic nuances aside, Plaintiff essentially agrees with the Statement of the Case as
it is presented in the Brief of Appellant. (See Brief of Appellant, at 3-9, of record.) With
regard to the contents of Plaintiff s Ex Parte Motion for Notice by Publication (hereinafter
"Ex Parte Motion") (R. at 9-12) and Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Service by Publication
(hereinafter "Affidavit") (R. at 15-17), which Defendants purport to summarize in their
Statement of the Case, Plaintiff asserts that the pleadings speak for themselves.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court properly ordered service of process by publication. Rule 4(d)(4)(A)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and relevant case law interpreting the Rule require that
a plaintiff who desires to serve a defendant through alternative means of service first
demonstrate that the whereabouts of the defendant are unknown and that plaintiff has
exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to locate the defendant. Plaintiffs Ex Parte
Motion and Affidavit set forth a sufficient basis for the trial court to conclude that Defendants
whereabouts were unknown and that Plaintiff had exercised reasonable diligence in
attempting to locate Defendants before turning to the court for leave to pursue alternative
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means ot service ot process. Plaintiff was not required to pursue all means possible or in
hindsight conceivable to locate Defendants, but only to exercise reasonable diligence, which
it did. It was not error for the trial court to find that reasonable diligence was exercised by
Plaintiff in attempting to locate Defendants. Therefore, Plaintiff having complied with Rule
4(d)(4)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, service by publication was effective in
bringing Defendants under the jurisdiction of the trial court. The default judgment was
properly entered against Defendants, and Defendants' Rule 60(b)(4) Motion was properly
denied by the trial court.
The trial court properly considered the totality of the circumstances in its
determination that Plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to locate
Defendants. Utah law has established that the exact contours of the reasonable diligence
standard fluctuate depending on the circumstances of each case. In its reasonable diligence
determination, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to consider the facts that
Plaintiff had redeemed the property twice in the past from tax sales, nor that Defendants
relied on a single alleged telephone conversation in 1986, as both facts are relevant to the
degree of effort necessary to satisfy the reasonable diligence requirement. It was not an
abuse of discretion for the trial court to consider all relevant information in its reasonable
diligence determination. Thus, jurisdiction was properly invoked over the Defendants, the
default judgment was properly entered, and Defendants' Rule 60(b)(4) Motion was properly
denied.
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Finally, assuming that the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over the
Defendants, default judgment was properly entered by the trial court below. The allegations
set forth in Plaintiffs Complaint were sufficient to state a cause of action against the
Defendants for quiet title and adverse possession. After valid service by publication,
Defendants failed to answer timely, their default was properly entered, and a default
judgment was properly entered against them. The trial court correctly entered the default
judgment against Defendants based upon the allegations contained in Plaintiffs Complaint.
Therefore, the trial court properly denied Defendants' Rule 60(b)(4) Motion.
Because the trial court properly denied Defendants' Rule 60(b)(4) Motion below, this
Court ought to affirm the trial court's order and allow Plaintiff the peace of mind and finality
of a properly obtained default judgment.
ARGUMENT
L

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANTS'
RULE 60(B)(4) MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT
JUDGMENT BY HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT
PROPERLY GRANTED ALTERNATIVE SERVICE OF
PROCESS BASED UPON THE AFFIDAVIT AND RECORD
BEFORE IT.
A.

Reasonable diligence standard of Rule 4(d)(4)(A) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

In their Brief Defendants correctly state the general standard for service by
publication as set forth in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and federal and Utah case law.
{See Brief of Appellant, at 11-12, of Record.) Rule 4(d)(4)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil
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Procedure states:
Where the identity or whereabouts of the person to be served are unknown and
cannot be ascertained through reasonable diligence, where service upon all of
the individual parties is impracticable under the circumstances, or where there
exists good cause to believe that the person to be served is avoiding service of
process, the party seeking service of process may file a motion supported by
affidavit requesting an order allowing service by publication or by some other
means. The supporting affidavit shall set forth the efforts made to identify,
locate or serve the party to be served, or the circumstances which make it
impracticable to serve all of the individual parties.
Thus, before a trial court may properly order alternative service of process, it must be
shown that the "identity or whereabouts of the person to served are unknown and cannot be
ascertained through reasonable diligence." Id.
As correctly pointed out by Defendants in their Brief of Appellant, this reasonable
diligence standard has its basis in the United States Supreme Court case of Mullane v.
Century Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). In Mullane, the United States
Supreme Court notes that the circumstances of each case are important to the determination
of the propriety of alternative service, and that the underlying standard is reasonableness:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding
which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their objections...The notice must be of
such nature as reasonably to convey the required information...and it must
afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance...But if
with due regard for the practicalities and peculiarities of the case these
conditions are reasonably met, the constitutional requirements are satisfied.

339 U.S. at 314 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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B.

Plaintiffs Affidavit and Ex Parte Motion were sufficient to
satisfy the reasonable diligence requirement of Rule
4(d)(4)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Plaintiff is entitled to the finality and peace of mind associated with a properly
obtained default judgment, since the Affidavit and Ex Parte Motion submitted by Plaintiff
and relied upon by the trial court to authorize service by publication were sufficient to satisfy
the reasonable diligence requirement of Rule 4(d)(4)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The requirements for an affidavit supporting a motion for alternative service of
process upon a defendant are well-established. Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney
Corporation, 545 P.2d 507, 509 (Utah 1976), cited by Defendants, states that, to be
sufficient, an affidavit supporting a motion for alternative service of process needs to set
forth more than "mere conclusions as to diligent search and inquiry." Further, the affidavit
"must set forth facts upon which the court can base a judgment as to whether such diligence
has been exercised to meet that requirement." Id. Importantly, the Downey Court concludes:
"But when he has done so, his judgement thereon is entitled to the same presumptions of
verity as other judicial determinations." Id.
Defendants rely heavily upon Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d 768 (Utah App.
1997), a case in which the Utah Court of Appeals found that an affidavit supporting a motion
for alternative service of process was insufficient to show the exercise of reasonable
diligence. Bonneville Billing is distinguishable in several important aspects. In analyzing
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Bonneville Billing, Defendants assert in their Brief ofAppellant "Particularly damaging to
plaintiffs case was its failure to set forth in its affidavit any efforts made to locate the
defendant once it learned that he might be living in California." {Brief ofAppellant, at 13
(citing Bonneville Billing, 949 P.2d at 775).) A review of the case, however, discloses that
the Utah Court of Appeals was most concerned that the affidavit was misleading and
fraudulent, an allegation that has not been made in the instant case. Bonneville Billing, 949
at 773-774. It is also notable that in Bonneville Billing, the Utah Court of Appeals found that
the plaintiff failed to follow up on leads garnered from an attempted service of process, again
a concern not alleged in the instant case. Id. at 775. Finally, Defendants state in their brief
that the Court of Appeals "required, at a minimum, that once a plaintiff had notice that the
original address was ineffective, the plaintiff was under an obligation to make an effort to
locate the defendant's present address." {Briefof Appellant, at 14 (citing Bonneville Billing,
949 at 775).) However, the Utah Court of Appeals never so holds. The Court merely holds,
based upon the particular fact in Bonneville Billing that the plaintiff was made aware of
another probable location of the defendant, that the plaintiff had to further explore that
location. Bonneville Billing, 949 at 775. Because the nature of a reasonable diligence
inquiry is fluid and very fact-intensive, Bonneville Billing must be viewed in light of its
underlying facts, which are distinguishable from the facts of the instant case.
A more analogous case than Bonneville Billing is Downey State Bank v. MajorBlakeney Corporation, 545 P.2d 507, 509 (Utah 1976).
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In Downey State Bank, the

defendant, an assignee of the defendant corporation's interest in the subject foreclosed
property, attacked the trial court's denial of his motion to set aside a default judgment which
foreclosed the property seven months earlier. The defendant in Downey State Bank claimed
that "the plaintiffs affidavit [supporting a motion for alternative service of process] was
insufficient to justify an order to publish summons; and...that no diligent search and inquiry
was in fact made." Id. at 508.
The Downey Court found that the "plaintiffs attorney contacted the last registered
Utah agent of Major-Blakeney Corporation and obtained the most recent address of [the
defendant,]" at which address the defendant could not be found. Id. On this basis "and the
further facts...that [the defendant's] assignor, Major-Blakeney Corporation, had ceased doing
business in Utah, had discontinued its post office box address in California, and that there
had been a bona fide attempt to serve [the defendant] at the only address known to or
reasonably obtainable by the plaintiff," this Court affirmed the lower court's decision to deny
the defendant's motion to set aside the judgment. Id. at 509. The Court explained:
It is true that the plaintiff did not exhaust all possibilities pointed out by the
defendant that it appears by hindsight might have been used as a means of
finding and serving him. But that is not what is required. The requirement is
that there be exercised reasonable diligence in good faith.
Id. (emphasis added).
As in Downey, this Court in Parker v. Ross, 217 P.2d 373 (Utah 1950), upheld the
trial court's determination that service by publication was proper under the circumstances.
In Parker, appellant argued that an "affidavit for publication was deficient by reason of
-9-

failure of plaintiff to show due diligence to locate [defendant] or to ascertain whether she
was deceased.55 217 P.2d at 376. Appellant argued that "locating an address of a nonresident
[defendant] and merely attempting to correspond with such nonresident without success, does
not constitute due diligence; that investigation must go further, and be conducted outside the
state where such person was once known to reside[.]55 Id. The Supreme Court disagreed:
The respondent in the instant case having shown by his affidavit for
publication facts sufficient to find that he had used due diligence to ascertain
whether defendant was within the state and not being able to find her there and
also having caused mail to be sent to her outside of the state to addresses it was
reasonable to believe would reach her and having received no reply, did all
that was necessary to try to find the whereabouts of the record owner of the
land to which he sought to quiet title. Our statutes do not require either in
spirit or intent that more be done than respondent did in the present case to try
to give actual notice to the record owner of the pending suit.
M a t 377.
In the case at hand, there is found in Plaintiffs Ex Parte Motion and the supporting
Affidavit more than "mere conclusions as to diligent search and inquiry.55 {See R. at 9-12,1517.) Plaintiff alleges in its Ex Parte Motion that the addresses and locations of Defendants
were unknown at the time of the filing of the Complaint, and therefore personal service
would have been ineffective. (R. at 9, ^f 1 ) Further, although Plaintiff had a mailing address
for Defendants Robert C. Marrs and Douglas R. Marrs, being 147 Calle Larga, Los Gatos,
California, 95030, a letter Plaintiffs counsel mailed to that address had been returned
"undeliverable". (R. at 10,12.) Therefore, service by mailing would have been ineffective
as well. (R. at 10, ^f 2.) True, no service of process was attempted at the only address
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available to Plaintiff, but, none is required under Rule 4(d)(4)(A) before service by
publication may be authorized by the court, Defendants' assertions to the contrary
notwithstanding. (R. at 43.)
As in Downey State Bank, Defendants, with the aid of three years of hindsight, have
asserted many hypothetical means by which Plaintiff may have uncovered the whereabouts
of Defendants at the time of the filing of the Complaint in this action. {See Brief of
Appellant, at 15; R. at 40-41.) However, as the Court in Downey State Bank noted, such an
exhaustion of all possibilities is not required. An exercise of reasonable diligence in good
faith is sufficient to support a motion for alternative process. Plaintiff asserts that it
exercised good faith reasonable diligence to locate Defendants prior to filing its Complaint
and Motion for Notice by Publication.
It may be true that Defendants resided at the same residence and worked at the same
place for ten years prior to the filing of the Complaint, as alleged by Defendants. {See Brief
of Appellant, at 15; R. at 38, 40.) Without knowing in which city the Defendants resided,
however, Plaintiff could not know which phone book of the State of California to consult to
locate the Defendants. Surely Plaintiffs were not required to telephone every person in the
United States who shares the same name as either of the Defendants.
Defendants have further alleged that in 1986 the parties exchanged telephone numbers
and other information. (R. at 35-36, 40) While not denying flatly that such a conversation
may have occurred more than 15 years ago, Plaintiff alleges the details of any such
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conversation cannot be recalled, and there is no recollection of whether or not any phone
number was given to Plaintiff at that time. (R. at 56,fflf5-6.) In fact, Rex Jackson, as
representative of Plaintiff, testifies that he never at any time recalls having the phone number
of either of the Defendants. (R. at 56, ^ 6.)
Even assuming, however, that Plaintiff, or someone representing Plaintiff, was given
a phone number fifteen years ago, that fact alone did not put Plaintiff on notice in 1999 that
the Marrs' current address varies with that given in the records of the Washington County
Records. Nor is it reasonable that Plaintiff should be required to remember the details of a
conversation occurring fifteen years ago or a specific phone number that may have been
given to him at that time.
Defendants have further alleged that Plaintiff could have possibly inquired about
Defendants' whereabouts through mutual acquaintances, (R. at 36,40), but do not allege that
Plaintiff was aware or had any basis to know of the mutuality of such acquaintances. Just
because Defendants knew someone who knew Plaintiff does not necessarily mean that
Plaintiff was aware that it knew someone who knew Defendants. Defendants have given no
basis on which to impute such knowledge to Plaintiff. In addition, Plaintiff, by and through
Rex Jackson, affirmatively represents to this Court that Plaintiff was either unacquainted or
merely slightly acquainted with those people listed in Defendants' Memorandum, and has
no recollection of any conversation with any of them at any time relative to Defendants or
the Property. (R. at 56, f 7.) It would be clearly unreasonable to require Plaintiff to inquire
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of all of its acquaintances as to the whereabouts of Defendants, especially when there is no
reason to suspect that they may have known. Moreover, Utah law does not require the
investigation of possible acquaintances before being granted alternative service of process.
On the other hand, it is obviously reasonable to rely on an address provided to the
Washington County Recorder's Office in connection with the subject Property.

If

Defendants wanted to assert their continuing interest in the Property, it can be expected that
they would provide a current address to which the properly tax notices could be sent. It
would therefore be reasonable in a matter involving such Property and the Defendants'
supposed interest therein to rely on an address provided to the Washington County
Recorder's Office, which is what Plaintiff did.
In addition to the foregoing, Plaintiff asserts that it would have been impracticable,
if not impossible, under the circumstances to locate the Defendants. Based upon information
and belief, during the seventeen years of their purported interest in the Property, Defendants
did not ever reside on the subject Property. (R. at 4, ^f 11.) Furthermore, Plaintiff believes
that Defendants have never even visited, much less improved the Property. (R. at 4, ^f 11.)
Defendants never attempted any telephonic or written communication with Plaintiff or its
representatives during the seventeen years of their purported interest in the Property, (r. at
52, ^f 4; R. at 56, ^ 6.), with the possible exception of the purported conversation occurring
in 1986, which is disputed. Based on information and belief, Defendants paid no property
taxes during the seventeen years of their purported interest in the Property, (R. at 6, If 12; R.
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at 52, ^ 4; R. at 56, ^ 6), nor did they bother to notify the Washington County Recorder's
Office of their alleged change of residence, thus insuring that the tax notices would not reach
Defendants. None of the foregoing allegations have ever been refuted by the Defendants.
Plaintiff twice redeemed the Property from tax sale foreclosures without any
communication of interest from the Defendants. (R. at 6,^| 13.) Were it not for such
redemptions, the Property would be in the possession of a third-party purchaser or the County
Tax Assessor's Office today. In sum, Defendants made no appreciable efforts at all prior to
their belated 60(b) (4) Motion to show an interest in the Property or to make their whereabouts
known either to the County or to the Plaintiff. They have managed to elude all of the
responsibilities incident to ownership of property in Washington County by successfully
cloaking themselves. In contrast, Plaintiff has always broadcasted its interest in the Property,
especially illuminating that interest by publicly filing an action to quiet title and adversely
possess the Property.
Despite Defendants' efforts to hide, Plaintiff took reasonable affirmative steps to
locate Defendants before the Complaint was filed in this matter. Counsel for Plaintiff
reviewed title documents of record and learned of one address for Robert and Douglas Marrs
at Los Gatos, California. (R. at 59, *)[ 4.) Further examination of title documents and
communication with the Washington County Recorder's Office, Assessor's Office, and
Treasurer's Office did not provide any additional information relative to the current
addresses of either of the Defendants Marrs other than the Los Gatos, California address.
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(R. at 59, % 4.) On or about the 26th day of June, 1998, Counsel for Plaintiff sent a certified
letter to Robert and Douglas Marrs at their last known address: 147 Calle Larga, Los Gatos,
California, 95030.

(R. at 59, ^ 5; R. at 61-62.)

The letter was returned to him

"undeliverable," with no forwarding address. (R. at 59, f 5.)
Finally, in its efforts to give Defendants notice, Plaintiff reasonably relied on and
faithfully complied with a valid Order for Notice by Publication issued by the Fifth Judicial
District Court. (See R. at 18-24.) In the Ex Parte Motion and supporting Affidavit relied
upon by the trial court in ordering that notice by publication, Plaintiff articulated reasonably
diligent efforts to locate Defendants at the time of the filing of the Complaint in this matter.
Plaintiff did all that was legally and reasonably required to ensure the quiet enjoyment of
property to which it was legally entitled. Plaintiff should therefore be entitled to the
presumption of verity, finality, and peace of mind incident to a properly granted default
judgment. The trial court correctly concluded that reasonable diligence had been exercised
by Plaintiff to locate Defendants before moving the trial court for alternative service of
process.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S CONSIDERATION OF PLAINTIFF'S
REDEMPTION OF THE PROPERTY AT TWO PREVIOUS TAX
SALES AND DEFENDANTS' RELIANCE ON A SINGLE
PHONE CALL IN 1986 WAS PROPER IN DETERMINING
WHETHER PLAINTIFF EXERCISED REASONABLE
DILIGENCE UNDER THE TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES
IN THIS CASE.

In their Brief of Appellant, Defendants argue that the "District Court erred in its
application of a "totality of circumstances" standard to the determination of whether Plaintiff
exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to locate defendants and notify them of the
action pending against them." (See Brief ofAppellant, at 17.) As an initial matter, in light
of the language in Mullane quoted in section IA above, it is inescapable that the trial court
was bound to consider the particular circumstances of the instant case in its determination.
That the trial court considered the totality of the circumstances in its determination is not in
itself error. The trial court was bound to do so under Mullane and other Utah case law
interpreting Mullane and Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Specifically, Defendants object to some of the particular circumstances relied upon
by the trial court in determining that Plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in attempting
to locate Defendants; namely, that the property was redeemed by Plaintiff at two separate tax
foreclosure sales, and that Defendants rely upon a phone call purportedly made by
Defendants in 1986 to Plaintiff. {See Brief ofAppellant, at 17-18; R. at 105, p. 16-17.)
First, there is no indication in the record that the trial court relied solely on these
circumstances in rendering its decision. In fact, the trial court explains that the foregoing
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circumstances are merely "part of the totality." (R. at 105, p.16.) Plaintiffs Affidavit and
Ex Parte Motion set fourth additional facts upon which the trial court also assumably relied
in rendering its decision.
Second, in Parker v. Ross, 111 P.2d 373, 379 (Utah 1950) (Wolfe, J, concurring),
upon which Defendants rely, Justice Wolfe states that "[t]he diligence to be pursued and
shown by the affidavit is that which is reasonable under the circumstances and not all
possible diligence which may be conceived." Further, "Due diligence must be tailored to fit
the circumstances of the case." Id. (emphasis added). There is an evident flexibility in the
definition of reasonable diligence as it applies to the specific circumstances of a particular
case. Parker suggests that what is considered reasonably diligent under a specific set of
circumstances may fall short under different circumstances. Reasonable diligence is a fluid
concept, reacting to the specific contours of a particular case.
At the hearing of this matter below, counsel for Plaintiff offered that "[A]s part of this
analysis, the court ought to look at the past conduct of the defendants in determining the
reasonability." (R. at 105, p. 12.) The trial court responded:
That is an interesting way of determining diligence. Because you would define
diligence in each individual case in a totality of the circumstance regarding the
defendant's demonstrated efforts toward the property. If you had a defendant
that had not let it go to tax sale, had paid the taxes for a period of time the,
apparently, has dropped off the face of the earth, at that point, you might have
more requirement that you would where there have been two tax sales go by
with no effort. That's what you are asking the court to do in this analysis.
(R. at 12.) The trial court correctly understood the inherent flexibility of the reasonable
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diligence standard.
Contrary to the position taken by Defendants, the fact that the property was redeemed
twice by Plaintiff at tax foreclosure sales without Defendants' interveation is highly relevant
to defining the contours of reasonable diligence in this particular case. The fact that the
properly was redeemed by the Plaintiff twice without the Defendants' intervention is relevant
to defining reasonable diligence in that it tends to show the indifference of Defendants
towards the property. Had Plaintiff not redeemed the Property at these tax sales, Utah law
would not permit Defendants from now arguing lack of notice of Ihese sales and thereby
regain their foreclosed property interests.
The fact that Plaintiff redeemed the Property twice from tax sales also shows that
Defendants' whereabouts were not reasonably ascertainable at least twice before when their
presence was crucial to the maintenance of their interests in the property. If anything, such
indifference to the property shows that Defendants were attempting to evade the
responsibilities of land ownership in the State of Utah. This indifference and evasion should
be considered in tailoring reasonable diligence to the facts of this case.
The fact that Defendants rely on a single phone call purportedly occurring in 1986 to
support their assertion that Plaintiff was aware of their whereabouts is also revealing. It
shows that in nearly two decades, Defendants have made no considerable efforts to disclose
their location to Plaintiff or to the State of Utah.
In light of the Defendants' seemingly diligent efforts to remain undisclosed, which
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is evidenced by their lack of participation at the past tax sales and their reliance upon a single
phone call placed in 1986, the diligence exercised by Plaintiff in locating them under the
totality of the circumstances was reasonable. The trial court properly considered all of the
circumstances in the case when determining reasonable diligence. Such consideration of all
relevant evidence is within the trial court's discretion, which it exercised reasonably, and not
grounds for reversal.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN ENTERING
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANTS BASED
UPON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT.

The allegations contained in Plaintiffs Complaint were sufficient to state a cause of
action for adverse possession by Plaintiff against a cotenant. Consequently, the trial court
correctly entered default judgment against Defendants pursuant to Rule 55 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, and correctly refused to set aside that default judgment.
Plaintiff agrees in principle with Defendants' interpretation of Rule 55 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure and applicable case law, but disagrees that Plaintiffs default
judgment fails for its failure to state a valid cause of action for adverse possession against
a cotenant.
A cotenant may oust another cotenant and effectively adversely possess an entire
parcel of land through "acts of the most open and notorious character, [which] clearly show
to the world, and to all having occasion to observe the condition and occupancy of the
property, that his possession is intended to exclude, and does exclude, the rights of his
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cotenant." Mathews v. Baker, 155 P. 427, 428 (Utah 1916) (citing Elder v. McClaskey, 70
F. 529, 542 (1895). Mathews provides an excellent example of what conduct meets the
preceding standard.
Mathews held land as tenant-in-common with other cotenants. Mathews, 155 P. at
428. She sought to quiet title to the property, claiming that she had taken title to the entire
property through adverse possession. Id. The trial court made several findings of fact that
were dispositive of Mathews' claim of adverse possession. First, Mathews paid all taxes and
assessments levied against the property for nearly two decades. Id. Second, Mathews made
substantial improvements to the property. Id. For example, Mathews planted shrubbery,
built walks, and constructed various structures on the property. Id. Third, Mathews was in
exclusive possession of the property for the statutory period. Id.
This Court held in Mathews that the foregoing findings were sufficient to establish
adverse possession. Id. at 429. Further, this Court found that actual notice and ouster were
not necessary; Mathews' acts were sufficient to constructively notify the other cotenants of
her intention to adversely possess the entire property. Id. at 428-429.
Mathews is very analogous to the instant case. Plaintiff plead in its Complaint
allegations very similar to the findings in Mathews, {see R. at 2-5.), which, in Mathews, were
sufficient not only to state a cause of action for adverse possession, but to prevail on the
merits. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged, as did Mathews, payment of taxes for at least thirty
years, substantial improvement of the property, and sole possession of the property for much
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more than the statutory period. (See R. at 3-5.) In addition, Plaintiff alleges payment and
maintenance of insurance on the property for the last thirty or more years, and redemption
of the property from two different tax sales without Defendants' interference or involvement.
(See R. at 4.)
Intheir Brief of Appellant, Defendants cite several cases in support of their contention
that Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action in its Complaint for adverse possession
against a cotenant. However, each of the cases cited to by Defendants is distinguishable from
the instant case.
Defendants first refer to McCready v. Frederickson, 136 P. 316 (Utah 1912), which
is an example of the failure of one cotenant successfully to establish a claim for adverse
possession against another cotenant. Id. at 320. McCready, however, is distinguishable on
its facts. McCready dealt with a very specific issue: whether a cotenant extinguishes a
tenancy-in-common and ousts his cotenant when he allows the property to be sold at a tax
sale, and then purchases it. Id. at 318. This Court held that redemption of the property at a
tax sale alone was not sufficient to oust a cotenant and establish adverse possession. Id. at
320. Furthermore, the language of the opinion suggests the decision is limited to the facts
of the case. See, i.e., id. at 320, 321. In fact, in his dissenting opinion in Dillman v. Foster,
656 P.2d 974,984 (Utah 1982), Chief Justice Hall distinguished McCready on the basis that
"[McCready's] holding was merely that the facts did not satisfy the requirements of [Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-7]." (Emphasis in original.)
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The second decision relied upon by Defendants, Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585 (Utah
1982), is likewise distinguishable on its facts. While it is true that the cotenants seeking to
oust the other cotenants had paid taxes on the property in order to preserve the title, id. at
589, they had not improved the property, nor did they enclose the property, id. at 586. The
property consisted of "undeveloped hilly terrain covered by scrub oak." Id. Like McCready,
Olwell seems to indicate that payment of taxes alone is not sufficient to adversely possess
against cotenants. Nevertheless, payment of taxes plus additional indicia of possession and
exclusion, as is seen in Mathews, can be sufficient.
The third case Defendants rely upon in their Brief of Appellant is Sperry v. Tolley, 199
P.2d 542 (Utah 1948). Sperry involved cotenants who owned four tracts of land as tenantsin-common. Heirs of one cotenant claimed to have adversely possessed two of the four tracts
of land. The heirs' claim was based on their sole possession of the two tracts. Id. at 545.
However, this Court reversed the lower court that had quieted title in the heirs, holding that
where cotenants occupy different parts of the whole, one cotenant cannot claim to have
adversely possessed that part that he or she possessed unless he or she had acted adversely
to the interests of the other cotenants. Id. at 546. Although the heirs had advertised the two
tracts for sale, which was adverse to the other cotenants' interest, the statutory length of time
for adverse possession had not been fulfilled. Id.
Sperry is distinguishable from the case at bar because it involved cotenants who were
all in possession of the land simultaneously, albeit they possessed different parts of the
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whole. Unlike the instant case, the cotenants in Sperry also shared in making improvements
and in the payment of taxes. Plaintiff in the instant case, however, was in exclusive
possession of the entire subject property. Plaintiff was also in a different position because
it alone paid all taxes assessed against the subject property, and it alone made improvements
to the property. The facts of Sperry are sufficiently different from the instant case that it
should not control the instant case.
In short, all three cases relied upon by Defendants in their Brief of Appellant are
distinguishable from the instant case. Mathews, however, is more directly on point. The
facts are similar, and the conclusion upon review by this Court should likewise be similar.
Having alleged facts in its Complaint similar to those that were sufficient in Mathews to win
on the merits, this Court should conclude that Plaintiff plead sufficient facts to state a cause
of action for adverse possession against cotenants. The default judgment was thus properly
entered below, and the trial court was correct in refusing to set it aside.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and in the interests of justice, Plainti ff respectfully requests
that this Court affirm the trial court's Order dismissing Defendants' Rule 60(b)(4) Motion
to Quash Service and Set Aside Default Judgment.
DATED this 3& day of June, 2003.
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